Dr. Yahya Al-Kubaisi
Demographic Change Against Sunni Arabs in Iraq
In a discussion with one of the groups concerning the displaced people of the Sunni Arab area of Jurf al-Sakhar, north of Babil Province (whose population numbers approximately 100,000 Sunni Arabs), whose residents have been categorically prevented from returning solely because they are Sunni Arabs, a well-known legal figure justified this measure by saying: “The Sunni residents of Jurf al-Sakhar were negligent regarding the presence of (ISIS), and according to the legal principle that states, ‘The negligent person is treated as the foolish person,’ therefore the security forces must delay their return until it is proven that such negligence no longer exists.” Another individual, who is close to one of the influential militias, was more explicit in expressing his position. According to him, the Sunni residents of Jurf al-Sakhar are “terrorists, of course, simply because they are Sunni Arabs.” Furthermore, he claimed that “Sunni Jurf al-Sakhar is an agricultural area whose contracts expired years ago, and they have no legal presence in that area.” He concluded by presenting what he considered a fundamental reason for preventing their return: that “the residents of Al-Musayyib, Al-Husayniyah, and Al-Saddah (which are predominantly Shiite areas) reject them.”
Control over the Sunni area of Jurf al-Sakhar was fully restored in October 2014. Days later, an official decision was issued by the Babil Provincial Council on October 29 of the same year, prohibiting any displaced person from returning to Sunni Jurf al-Sakhar for eight months under the pretext of clearing the area of explosive devices and dismantling booby-trapped houses, after which displaced families would supposedly be allowed to return. However, in April 2017, more than 30 months after the area had been recaptured, the same provincial council confirmed that “the return of the Sunni displaced people of Jurf al-Sakhar depends on the reconstruction of infrastructure and the removal of mines.”
This official refusal to allow the displaced to return receives explicit political cover from the Shiite political actor that dominates political, military, and security decision-making within the Iraqi state, amid implicit complicity from the international community, including the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). In the latest human rights report issued by the mission (July 2016), there was no reference whatsoever to the issue of Sunni Jurf al-Sakhar or to the other areas where displaced persons are prevented from returning, except for a brief statement in the executive summary noting that: “Many obstacles continue to hinder the safe and dignified return of displaced persons in line with human rights standards and international humanitarian standards.”
Moreover, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Jan Kubiš, did not go beyond expressing concern in his briefing to the Security Council on May 22, 2017, regarding what he described as the “delay in the return of displaced persons to areas liberated long ago, such as Sunni Jurf al-Sakhar or places in Diyala Province,” without any indication that there were official politically-backed decisions preventing such return, or “official” agreements imposing “humiliating, harsh, and sectarian conditions” in exchange for permitting displaced persons to return, as occurred in the areas of Yathrib and Aziz Balad in Salah al-Din Province.
The issue of demographic change related to the struggle over geography is not practically tied only to the moment of the Islamic State organization and the attempts by all parties to exploit it in order to impose new realities on the ground by force. Rather, it is an extension of systematic sectarian operations (ethnic, religious, and doctrinal in nature) that began after the occupation in 2003 and aimed at creating lines of separation isolating Iraqis from one another on the basis of sectarian sub-identities within geographically homogeneous areas.
Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Basra in particular witnessed forced displacement and genocide against Sunni Arabs beginning from the moment of the occupation. The bombing of the Al-Askari Shrine in Samarra in February 2006 by Shiite militias provided an opportunity that Shiite governments exploited to intensify acts of genocide against Sunni Arabs, taking advantage of the populist cover that existed at the time, particularly in Baghdad. It is clear that the same actors are now attempting to exploit the moment of the Islamic State organization to expand this demographic change to include the provinces of Diyala, Salah al-Din, Nineveh, Anbar, and Kirkuk as part of the post-Islamic State maps being drawn on the ground.
What is dangerous here is the international complicity with these systematic operations, which are taking place openly and under official cover. What occurred in Syria during the past two years in terms of “population displacement” clearly illustrates this reality. Everyone possesses detailed knowledge of what is happening on the ground, yet no one objects.
The United States was a silent witness to the large-scale demographic change operations that took place in the Al-Mada’in area southeast of Baghdad in 2005 and did nothing. It acted similarly regarding the demographic change that later occurred in the Al-Nahrawan area. After the Samarra incident, the United States completely turned a blind eye to the demographic change operations taking place in Baghdad under blatant government complicity at the highest levels.
Indeed, the “Law Enforcement Plan” announced by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on February 14, 2007, which involved deploying 50,000 Iraqi troops supported by 35,000 American soldiers, was used to consolidate what had already taken place and to attempt to complete the “elimination” of certain areas that had not yet been fully resolved. The clearest example was what occurred in the Al-Bayaa and Hayy Al-Amil areas within the Al-Rasheed district southwest of Baghdad.
Forces from the First Brigade of the Second Division of the Kurdish Peshmerga were deployed in the northern and western parts of this district, but tensions between these forces and Shiite militia elements led, after nearly three months, to the replacement of the Peshmerga forces with Interior Ministry commando forces. This resulted in a wave of extrajudicial killings and forced displacement for sectarian reasons. All of this took place under the sight and hearing of American forces.
Today, when official American envoys are questioned at the highest levels about this issue, one hears nothing but meaningless diplomatic language expressing confidence in the government and its procedures regarding the matter.
Ultimately, the systematic demographic change operations currently targeting Sunni Arabs cannot be separated from the large-scale displacement operations that took place in 2006, 2007, 2014, 2016, and 2018, as well as the smaller displacement operations before and after those years. Nor can these demographic change operations be separated from the nature of the political conflict in the region.
Unless the international actors intervene and impose minimum-level understandings, demographic change against Sunni Arabs will continue to serve as an effective “weapon” in the ongoing war of genocide against Sunni Arabs.
Dr. Yahya Al-Kubaisi