Introduction

Since the establishment of the modern Iraqi state by British colonialism in 1921, the peoples of modern Iraq have not experienced sustainable political or social stability. This entity was founded as an artificial central state formed from three different regions containing multiple ethnicities and religious sects under an imposed central authority, without recognition of the historical and social particularities of each component. After more than a century since its establishment, it has become clear that the central system has failed to manage diversity, and that federalism, as a constitutional option stipulated in Articles (116–121) of the current 2005 Iraqi Constitution, represents the optimal solution for redefining relations between the components on legal and democratic foundations.

Failures of the Central State Throughout History

From the very beginning, a monarchical system was imposed on Iraq through the appointment of a foreign king who had no social or historical connection to the land. Nevertheless, waves of coups and uprisings did not cease:

Military Coups

• 1933: Bakr Sidqi coup
• 1941: Rashid Ali al-Gaylani coup
• 1958: July 14 Communist coup (Abdul Karim Qasim)
• 1963: February 8 coup (First Ba’ath coup)
• 1963: November 18 coup by Arab nationalists (Abdul Salam Arif)
• 1968: July 17 coup (Second Ba’ath coup)
• 1973: Nazim Kazar coup attempt (failed)
• Multiple coup attempts between 1970–1991 (failed)

Kurdish Uprisings

• 1922–1931: Sheikh Mahmoud al-Hafid uprising
• 1931–1932: Sheikh Ahmed Barzani movement
• 1943–1945: Mullah Mustafa Barzani uprising
• 1961–1970: Kurdish revolution against Baghdad
• 1974–1975: Second Kurdish-Iraqi War
• 1991: Major Kurdish uprising

Shiite Uprisings

• 1977: Safar uprising
• 1980–1982: Uprising following the killing of Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr
• 1991: Sha’ban uprising

Sunni Uprisings

• 1959: Mosul uprising
• 1995–1996: Anbar uprising
• 2013–2014: Uprising in Sunni provinces and regions

These coups reflect the failure of the central state to build stable institutions, as authority became an instrument of conflict between ruling elites rather than a unifying framework for the peoples of Iraq.

Wars and Regional Conflicts

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) was a direct result of ideological and sectarian contradictions. Iran sought to export Khomeini’s Shiite revolution into Iraq, which raised deep fears among the Sunni component that felt an existential threat. In contrast, part of the Shiite component found itself sympathetic to Iran due to sectarian ties.

The war ended without achieving any stability; instead, it weakened state institutions and later paved the way for the 2003 war that overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime and brought Iranian-backed Shiite forces to power, beginning a new phase of sectarian rule.

The Sectarian System After 2003

Since 2003, elections have not produced a genuine political majority. Instead, Shiite parties manipulated constitutional texts according to their interests. In some electoral cycles, they considered the “winning list” to be authorized to form the government, while in other cycles they interpreted Article (76) of the Constitution as meaning that “the largest bloc in parliament after the elections” held the right to form the government. This shifting interpretation emptied the constitutional text of its legal meaning and resulted in the continued dominance of specific parties supported by militias loyal to Iran.

The Crisis of Electoral Participation

The crisis did not stop at constitutional manipulation; it was also reflected in the loss of public confidence. In the most recent parliamentary elections in 2021, more than 80% of the peoples of Iraq boycotted the electoral process, which represents additional evidence that the sectarian central system has lost its social and political legitimacy. A government elected by only a very small minority of voters cannot be considered a legitimate representative of Iraq’s diverse peoples.

Federalism as a Constitutional and Practical Option

The 2005 Iraqi Constitution clearly states in Article (116) that “the federal system in the Republic of Iraq is composed of a capital, regions, decentralized governorates, and local administrations.” Article (117/First) also recognized the Kurdistan Region and its existing authorities. Article (118) further established a mechanism for creating new regions through a law passed by a simple majority in the Council of Representatives. In addition, Law No. (13) of 2008 — the Law on the Implementation of Article (119) of the Constitution — set forth the procedural details for the establishment of regions.

Based on these texts, federalism is not merely a political option, but an inherent constitutional right that allows Iraq’s components to manage their affairs freely within the framework of the federal state. The experience of the Kurdistan Region has demonstrated that the federal system is more capable of achieving stability compared to the central government in the capital.

The Role of the United States and the International Community

The Strategic Framework Agreement signed in 2008 between Iraq and the United States remains in effect. It is the responsibility of international actors, foremost among them Washington, to support the proper implementation of the Iraqi Constitution, including activating the articles related to federalism. Applying the Constitution impartially would restore balance not only in Iraq but across the region as a whole, since the continuation of sectarian centralism exacerbates security crises and opens the door to foreign intervention.

Rebuilding Trust Between the Components

Establishing regions on constitutional foundations would help rebuild bridges between the components. The Shiite component would realize that the Sunni component does not seek domination or revenge, but rather seeks the restoration of its lands and constitutional rights, the return of displaced persons and refugees, and clarification of the fate of those forcibly disappeared. This realization could strengthen the position of moderate Shiite forces and Shiite youth seeking liberation from Iranian dominance, and open the way for a genuine partnership based on mutual respect, particularly given that Shiite society is considered the most religiously conservative and the least educated.

Conclusion

After more than a century since the founding of the state, experience has proven that the central system in Iraq has failed to build a stable and just state for its peoples. Wars, coups, authoritarianism, and corruption are all direct products of this system. Federalism, as a constitutional and legal option, represents the only path to saving Iraq from collapse and transforming its diversity into a source of strength rather than a cause of conflict, and a basis for rebuilding it on proper foundations that guarantee security and stability for all its peoples.